PSC Discussion Papers Series
Volume 20 | Issue 6

Article 1

6-2006

Demographic Decisions and Demographic WellBeing
Rajulton Fernando
University of Western Ontario, fernando@uwo.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/pscpapers
Recommended Citation
Fernando, Rajulton (2006) "Demographic Decisions and Demographic Well-Being," PSC Discussion Papers Series: Vol. 20 : Iss. 6 ,
Article 1.
Available at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/pscpapers/vol20/iss6/1

ISSN 1183-7284

Demographic Decisions and
Demographic Well-Being
by
Fernando Rajulton

Discussion Paper no. 06-06

June 2006

Presidential Address, Canadian Population Society Meetings, June 3, 2006

On the web in PDF format: http://sociology.uwo.ca/popstudies/dp/dp06-06.pdf

Population Studies Centre
University of Western Ontario
London CANADA N6A 5C2

Demographic Decisions and Demographic Well-Being
Fernando Rajulton
Presidential Address, Canadian Population Society Meetings,
June 3, 2006

It may come as a surprise to many of you to see a title like this coming from me as my
Presidential Address. To tell you the truth, I have been toying with many ideas until last
week when I finally decided to deliver my address on this topic. My decision is certainly
not a demographic decision, but it is a decision driven mostly by its aptness to honor the
contributions made not only by our honoree, Doug Norris, but also by many of us during
our lifetime. Although at first sight the topic doesn’t seem to be related to mathematical
demography, all the ideas I am sharing with you today are coming from the rich research
experience of demographers, in particular mathematical demographers.
I decided to speak on this topic because of the recent events in demographic research
circles in Canada. You may be aware of the contributions the demographers are making
toward Canadian social policies through the workshops and conferences organized by
Human Resources and Social Development Canada (HRSDC) and Policy Research
Initiative (PRI) during the past few months. We are happy to see this turn of events,
especially among the government agencies to listen to what demographers have to say. At
the same time I am a bit concerned too because of what we have learned from the history
of our neighboring country south of the border. Let me say a few words about that history
to inform those who are not aware of it and to remind those who already know it.
It was in the year 1969 when the then US President Richard Nixon convened the
Rockefeller Commission on Population Growth and the American Future to evaluate the
challenges posed by continued population growth in the US. In his speech to the
Congress, Nixon said “…perhaps the most dangerous element in the present situation is
the fact that so few people are examining these questions from the viewpoint of the whole
society… In the governmental sphere, there is virtually no machinery through which we
can develop a detailed understanding of demographic changes and bring that

understanding to bear on public policy” (Nixon, 1969; italics mine). Such a wonderful
testimony to the important role of demography in public policy simply could not have
come from a politician. I am sure a demographer should have written it. I would strongly
encourage you to read it, if you have not already done so. What happened after that
remarkable speech by Nixon is history. Three years after Nixon’s speech, the Rockefeller
commission came with its many recommendations, at least two of which (universal
access to contraception and liberalizing abortion laws) were politically abhorrent to
Nixon who dismissed entirely the work of the Commission. Charles Westoff, the
executive director of the Commission wrote in the journal Population Index (1973:501)
that ”The President’s response issued in May 1972 was a disappointment at every
level….In effect, the responses were narrowly political and greatly at variance with the
concerns about population that the President had expressed less than three years earlier”.
History is known to repeat itself. But I hope we will not face a similar situation, given the
changing political landscape of Canada today.
We should be glad about the turn of events at the federal agencies and we hope that same
interest will permeate the policy making agencies in the provinces. Policy makers are
becoming more aware of the importance of studying the demographic changes and their
implications for social policies. In a way, policy makers are beginning to realize that
“Demography, the study of human populations, is the most powerful – and most
underutilized – tool we have to understand the past and to foretell the future.
Demographics affect every one of us as individuals, far more than most of us have ever
imagined. They also play a pivotal role in the economic and social life of our country.”
(Foot, 1998:2).
Following Hauser and Duncan (1959:2), we are used to defining demography in our
lectures as “the study of the size, territorial distribution, and composition of population,
changes therein, and the components of such changes”. It is fitting that this definition
includes two important phrases - “composition of population” and “changes therein”.
These two phrases broaden demography to encompass many disciplines and we are often
proud to say that Demography is essentially interdisciplinary. Despite the sometimes

acrimonious academic squabbles between demographers and sociologists seen in some
university departments, it is hard to imagine whether social science – any social science,
for that matter - can advance at all as a science without first knowing the basic
information about the human population that it studies.

Demographic Decisions
Composition of a population and changes therein essentially imply that individuals in a
population or a society are making decisions in their daily lives that affect the
composition of the population in many ways. As we know only too well, it is the day-today demographic decisions of individuals in a society - let me stress the term
“demographic” here because not many think of it that way – that shape and determine not
only the three basic components of population growth, namely fertility, mortality and
migration but also all other related behaviors.
People make a variety of demographic decisions for many reasons. Mortality seems to be
an exception, at least until now. Except for a few who approach Doctor Death or commit
suicide, people do not decide to die, not only because nobody willingly likes to die but
also because whether we like it or not, we all die anyway. Otherwise in all other spheres
of life, which can be classified into three main forms, namely the Self, the Intimate and
the Social (McDonald, 1996), people make decisions all the time. People decide to
migrate looking for greener pastures to improve their lives. People decide to marry,
cohabit or form a couple relationship, whether of the same or opposite sex. People
decide to have children or not, which in our times is more than ever closely associated
with the idea of liberation, especially of women. [Just a few days ago I heard the
expression “childless” has fallen out of use in Europe; people prefer to use the expression
“childfree” instead – well, what a great liberation!] People decide to divorce and remarry.
The Federal Act of Divorce 1968 had spelled out several conditions for hearing the case
for divorce such as adultery, mental or physical cruelty, homosexual conduct, addiction
to alcohol or narcotics and separation for three years or desertion for five years. A
divorce was granted in two steps and the second step, the decree, was necessary for
remarriage. The Divorce Act of 1985 simplified everything. Divorce is granted on only

one condition: breakdown of marriage, established by proof of adultery, mental or
physical cruelty, or separation for one year. The impact of this change in the Divorce Act
is quite clear. When I was coming by bus yesterday to York University from the
Downsview metro station, I saw several ads at a bus stop. There were ads like “Quick
driving test”, “Quick BA Diploma”, and so on. And I noticed surprisingly an ad that read
“Quick Divorce - from $300”. The point here is that social policies have tremendous
impact on people’s demographic decisions. We shall come back to this point later.
Over the past three decades, changes in social attitudes, family laws and social security
provisions have led to significant changes in the way people make their demographic
decisions. These demographic decisions can create all the differences in a nation and
between nations. Small changes introduced by demographic decisions that people make
daily can accumulate over time, introduce further changes in social attitudes and
behavior, thus eventually creating a “distinct” society or nation. Changes in patterns of
marriage and fertility or, in general, family transformations that we witness today, are
actually the accumulated outcomes of millions of personal demographic decisions made
by men and women of past generations. In a recent paper that examines the so-called
“fertility divide” among Canadian and American women, Torrey and Eberstadt (2005)
point out that differences in fertility in Canada and the US may say less about the future
than about the present. These two societies are becoming different at the same time as
their economies integrate and become more interdependent. Why then the fertility divide?
The answer lies in the fact that the “basic rhythms of private lives are diverging as
women in Canada enter common-law unions more often, wait longer than American
women to marry, and have children later and less often”. We know fertility is a leading
indicator of other changes taking place in a society. If the North American fertility
divergence continues, Canada and the US may become an example of how countries can
converge at the macroeconomic level while diverging at the micro level of individuals
and families. Micro- and macro-economic explanations of demographic behavior, in
particular fertility behavior, might have helped us to explain historical transitions in the
past but their explanatory power becomes minimal beyond a certain threshold of
development and individualism.

Demographic Well-Being
Like all decisions, demographic decisions have a future orientation and impact. We have
expectations or hopes about how a specific demographic decision that we make will
affect our lives. In general, we do not think about how these decisions will affect our
society at large. Some of these demographic decisions are definitely at the top of the list
in terms of our own well-being and purpose in life. Forming and dissolving couple
relationships, having children and moving to greener pastures are certainly important life
events that enrich our own well-being and purpose in life. We are more than willing to
“grin and bear” any hardships or difficulties that may accompany these decisions and to
go through any amount of social adjustment associated with those decisions. What we do
not normally think about is the fact that these demographic decisions not only enrich our
own well-being and purpose in life but they enrich also the well-being of the society we
live in. It is this well-being of the society at large that I am calling here “demographic
well-being”.
You may be wondering why I am interested in thinking about demographic well-being. It
all started with the discussion the group of demographers at Western had a few months
ago over the life course framework we were proposing to PRI. Connecting the different
life events, we were brainstorming about what these events finally lead to. Then, all of us
agreed that all life events eventually lead to our well-being. It is certainly a good idea.
Since then I have been musing about what sort of well-being are we really thinking of?
This presidential address is the outcome of my musing over the last few weeks. Not all
ideas can be expressed in a short time allocated to this address, but I shall be content with
pointing out a few directions for others to pursue.
First, that there is something like demographic well-being is not usually said or heard in
our discourses or research works except for implicit implications of what would happen if
that demographic well-being is not there, for example, an ageing society. Do we need a
new expression “demographic well-being” at all? Why can’t we be simply happy with
the term already in use such as, for example, social well-being? Or, do not the two terms social and demographic well-being - mean the same thing? You may think otherwise. But
I am here arguing for using the term “demographic well-being” (DWB), because the

well-being that follows demographic decisions has a unique characteristic that is not
found in other types of well-being, say social well-being. Decisions made by us as
individuals are personal and demographic, they are not personal and social. Times are
gone when demographic decisions were considered to be social. For example, in the past
a marriage was considered to be, not so much a personal decision; it was fundamentally a
family or social decision. So too was childbearing. In our times, demographic decisions
have become more and more personal, based on personal autonomy, growth and
fulfillment. In fact, societies (especially developed societies) have made various
accommodations in their legal and constitutional rights of individuals such that these
decisions have become more and more personal and “individualistic”, no longer “social”.
As I am going to say later, societies have experimented with this as a sort of “solution” to
the problems raised by changing demographic decisions of people.
Second, I prefer to use the term “demographic well-being” because it exists in its own
right. It is not the same thing as “social well-being”. Rather, if we think carefully,
demographic well-being (DWB) leads to social well-being (SWB). SWB follows DWB,
not the other way.
Third, I am arguing for using the expression DWB not only because of my professional
bias towards demography (which should be obvious!) but also because of my personal,
professional bias toward putting other expressions of well-being in their proper place,
especially those that have been overemphasized in our daily thinking, reading and living.
This point may become clear with what I have to say in the following paragraphs.
I was curious to find out the number of instances the expression “demographic wellbeing” is used at all in any literature. I searched through the web pages and went through
so many papers, scientific and nonscientific. I found only a handful of instances where
the expression “demographic well-being” is explicitly used. To my surprise and delight,
one of these instances is the web page maintained by the province of Newfoundland and
Labrador which mentions clearly the province’s programs are geared toward the “social

and demographic well-being” of people (see, for example, the province’s web page at
http://www.releases.gov.nl.ca/releases/2002/exec/0916n05.htm).
Researchers use the term “well-being” under many aspects.

The most often used

expression is economic well-being; in fact, “well-being” is simply equated to “economic
well-being”, nothing else matters. We can also hear frequently in discussions and
research papers the term well-being used exclusively to imply health, in particular
physical health. Beyond the health aspect, we hear of “psychological well-being”,
“consumer well-being”, “emotional well-being”, “subjective well-being”, “sexual wellbeing”, and, somewhat rarely compared to others, “social well-being” (implying mostly
participation, belonging and tolerance). These different aspects of well-being are
certainly not mutually exclusive; they often overlap; so too research on well-being. We
can add to this list any number of other aspects of well-being. But personally, perhaps
because of my professional bias again, I prefer to look at them all as offshoots of DWB
because none of them can exist without DWB.
In the current literature on well-being, economic well-being is the most frequently talked
about, no wonder because of the obsession with economic growth and the money it
would bring into our pockets. Politicians do not hesitate to talk about the “money in your
pockets”, and two to four hundred dollars more in people’s pockets seem to sway their
votes from one political party to another. Our economy has recently shown good signs of
growth which may continue sometime into the foreseeable future. But has it really
improved the economic well-being of Canadians? Many studies indeed show a decline in
well-being, not only economic but also social and other aspects of well-being.
Consider, for example, the persistent economic or income disparity among families that
many research papers talk about. Since 1970s, the rich are getting richer and the poor are
getting poorer. Real average family income has definitely increased over time (30 to
40%), however this increase is not spread evenly across all families. (Statistics Canada,
1999). What is important to stress here is the difference in income disparity has to do
with the demographic changes in family structure and the changing nature of families.
Thus, in the 70s, those aged 65 dominated the bottom decile of income; extreme poverty

was a problem of the old. In 1995 and thereafter, the elderly had been replaced by female
single parents, who accounted for 24% of the bottom decile in the seventies but a
whopping 40 percent in 1995.
In general, the so-called “economic explanations” of demographic decisions with which
we are only too familiar, have not ultimately explained much of demographic decisions
after all. Consider all the economic explanations researchers have explored to explain
fertility, for example. As pointed out earlier, two nations can converge economically but
at the same time diverge in their value systems and hence in their fertility. I am
personally glad to see that more recent demographic research works try to de-emphasize
the economic rational choice theory and to focus more on social and psychological
theories of demographic behavior (see, for example, the program on Institutional and
Political Approaches to Family and Fertility Dynamics at Max Planck Institute for
Demographic

Research,

Rostock,

available

http://www.demogr.mpg.de/general/structure/division2/lab-ceffd/49.htm].

at
I

am

not

saying that economic factors do not at all play their role in demographic decisions, far
from it. But, to give such an important place to economic rationality is unwise and
fruitless.

Implications of Demographic Decisions and Demographic Well-Being
What then are the implications if we talk about demographic well-being ensuing from
demographic decisions? The first obvious implication is the way we try to explain
demographic decisions. As said earlier, individual choice and decisions cannot be simply
considered as the rational man maximizing his “utility”, whatever that ambiguous term
may mean. Rather, they need to be considered within the “cultural” or
“sociodemographic” context in which the decisions are made. This context may include
hard to measure factors such as power, status, politics, networks, values, social policies,
and so on.

Figure 1: Age Structures by Immigrant status,
Canada 2001
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The second implication is the greater role the age structure should play in our research.
The unique way of capturing the changes introduced by demographic decisions is to
study the age structure changes, classified by various dimensions of well-being one can
see as relevant. As we are all aware, declining fertility, not so much declining mortality,
has far-reaching ripple effects on the age structure. They touch on all age-specific
activities and programs throughout society. Here is the age structure of Canadian
population from Census 2001 (see Figure 1). Instead of just looking at the age structure
for the whole population, let us look at it, for example, by immigrant status (for
simplicity, born in Canada and born outside Canada). It is striking that the proportions in
the younger age groups among the Canadian-born are higher than those among the
foreign-born. Note that these Canadian-born include children born to the foreign-born as
well. In contrast, the proportions of foreign-born children and young adults are
remarkably lower than the overall age structure. Above age 18, the Canadian-born age
structure and the total population’s age structure almost perfectly coincide. We can also
note the remarkable contributions made by the adult foreign-born to the age structure of
the Canadian population.

Figure 2: Age structures by Employment Status,
Canada 2001
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As a second example, if one is interested in the economic aspect of age structure, one can
look at the age structure by employment status (see Figure 2). The picture is quite
interesting and calls for more serious examination in terms of demographic well-being of
Canadians, not only in the present but also in the future.
Talking about the age structure, an important question for further research would be: Is
there then anything like an “optimal age structure”? This question resembles the question
that has been debated for centuries in human history, namely the optimum population
size. But it is not simply an optimum size that we are talking about here, rather the
question is about an optimum age structure. It would be worth investigating further the
optimum age structure with respect to certain key aspects of well-being. An interesting
case would be, for example, what would be the optimal age structure that would enable
us to preserve the social benefits well into old age. As far as I know, there was only one
study published more than two decades ago, by Martin Feldstein of Harvard University,
that examined a point somewhat related to this.

I would like to emphasize here that the concept of optimal age structure is different from
what some researchers are talking about these days as “demographic gift”- an expression
referring to the age structure found in many developing countries, consisting of relatively
fewer dependent children and relatively few elderly, but with a larger share of working
age population (Bloom and Williamson,1998; Birdsall et al., 2001). During the IUSSP
conference in Tours I heard this expression so often used by researchers from developing
countries, particularly from Africa. They all express an optimistic view that such an age
structure is a “blessing” to their developing countries unlike the problems faced by
developed societies. No, such an inference is a bit naïve, if such a “demographic gift” is
not going to be accompanied by other aspects of well-being as well, besides the fact that
with declining fertility such a “gift” can only be considered as a temporary phenomenon.
The third implication is that people themselves are ultimately responsible to bear the
future implications of their own demographic decisions in terms of demographic wellbeing. An interesting and current phenomenon that we are witnessing today is what the
baby boomers are experiencing and are going to experience in the future. As Easterlin,
Schaefer, and Macunovich (1993) argued more than a decade ago, the baby boomers
delayed marriage (or never married) and had fewer children in order to narrow the gap
between their real and expected levels of income (compared to their parents’ income).
The important demographic decision the baby boomers made, namely increasing
participation of women in the labor force and forgoing childbirth, obviously helped them
to become markedly better-off economically than their predecessors. But as Easterlin and
colleagues argued, they may have sacrificed their demographic well-being in order to
achieve their economic prosperity or economic well-being. “In effect, an improvement in
the economic status over that of their parents was purchased at the expense of family life”
(p. 513). The baby boomers were and are economically better-off but they are poorer in
terms of demographic well-being. Therefore, a large number of baby boomers will be
forced to face retirement without the financial and emotional support of adult children or
a spouse. They are responsible for the DWB they have created through their own
demographic decisions. No society and no government can be expected to perform

miracles in the absence of DWB without adversely affecting the DWB of future
generations.
The fourth implication is the role of policies for DWB. Most policy makers in developed
societies like Canada consider “tampering” with people’s demographic decision-making
anathema to the democratic process. Our political systems and policy making bodies are
under the impression that demographic decisions are made exclusively by individuals
without any influence from government policies. This becomes quite evident when we
discuss with policy makers. But there is an irony here. While childbearing is considered a
deeply personal matter that is resolved only in the “bedrooms of a nation” or that should
be left entirely to the individuals and not to governments, the other demographic
processes, especially mortality/health and migration, are very much the concern of
governments. By refusing to engage in all demographic decision making processes, many
are blind to the future consequences of these processes, hence of demographic wellbeing, affected by all policies that have indirect impact on people’s demographic
decisions every day. All policies, whether explicitly demographic or not, are implicitly
demographic, and they all have enormous demographic consequences for the future. It is
worrisome then that most policies occur in our country without proper demographic
scrutiny. Sometimes we wish that while framing policies, politicians would think more
about future consequences of the demographic decisions of today than their own partisan
convictions and conventions.
Peter Hicks, before becoming the Assistant Deputy Minister of Social Development
Canada, wrote a report on Preparing for Tomorrow’s Social Policy Agenda (Hicks,
2002). In that report, he suggested in Section 5 titles “Planning for an uncertain future:
Three scenarios” that policy research and development be consistent with a wide range of
plausible future policy directions. The development work he proposed in that report
touched on three different scenarios about the future. The third scenario he proposed was
what he called “Life Is Citizenship”. This scenario puts more emphasis on the
interrelations among the various domains of life, “including caregiving and the nonmarket domains of society as well as greater collective effort in building social

infrastructure, particularly around housing and caregiving of children and seniors,
including a concern about fertility levels” (p.15)

These various domains of life as citizens are what are ultimately meant by the expression
DWB. Whenever I teach courses in demography, at the beginning of the course, I define
demography, as we all do, using the above quoted Duncan and Hauser’s words. And then,
I tell students what the word “demography” ultimately means. Summarizing all the
debates over the centuries about human population, I learned the Chinese had a
wonderful way of expressing what “demography” or simply “population” means. Here is
the Chinese word for population – rán kău - a pictograph (see Figure 3), that tells us what
exactly demography is all about. Demography = Person + a mouth to feed + a house to
shelter. Policies need to address these two domains first, namely food and housing. Peter
Hicks mentioned them in the Report. I am afraid, they unfortunately stay on the report.
Food banks and shelters for the homeless are reporting conspicuous increase in the
number of people who need their support. It would be worthwhile to examine seriously
the trends in these two basic aspects of DWB. Even if people have their homes, the

question of affordability is a more serious concern than ever. In a study that I did recently
on housing and housing conditions in Canada using the 2001 Census, it was clear that
only three fourths of Canadian households meet the affordability criterion (defined as
spending less than 30% of before-tax household income on shelter costs). Eighty-four
percent of owners spend less than 30% of their incomes on housing, while only sixty
percent of renters do so (see Figure 4). Further, variations by household type or by family
structure are once again apparent here. Challenges in providing affordable housing to all
citizens of the country are many. But one is struck with the silence on the part of
governments, either federal or provincial, on this primary DWB, especially in many of
Canada’s major urban centres.
I do not mean to criticize the policy making processes in our nation. In fact, if we study
the past, we cannot but admire how our society and social policies over time have made
various adjustments to find a societal solution to the conflict people experience in their
day-to-day life because of their demographic decisions. Our social policies have indeed
tried to find a societal solution to this increased conflict, to ameliorate the impact of this
conflict. Greater flexibility in the ways we can arrange or break our relationships, newer
and greater support in combining work and family responsibilities, tolerance of
alternative lifestyles are all major social changes brought about by various social policies
in Canada. At the same time, however, it is good to study in depth what kind of
demographic well-being do these changes entail for the future. As said earlier, these
changes have far lasting consequences.
To summarize the ideas that I have shared with you here, let me put it this way. We are at
a point in history when demographic decisions and demographic well-being are in our
own hands, not in the hands of policy makers, and not in the hands of governments. And,
it is important for all of us to bear in mind that our demographic decisions of today will
make the destiny of our nation tomorrow.

Figure 4 : Affordability by tenure and major categories of household type – Census 2001
a) All Households
Affordability
Spending less than 30% of household income on housing costs
Spending 30% or more of household income on housing costs
Total

Affordability
Spending less than 30% of household income on housing costs
Spending 30% or more of household income on housing costs
Total
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Spending less than 30% of household income on housing costs
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Total
Number
%
8559255 75.9
2720070 24.1
11279330

One-family
Number
%
6345440
82.1
1381105
17.9
7726545

Household Type
Multiple-family
Number
%
168665
86.8
25660
13.2
194325

Non-family
Number
%
2045150
60.9
1313305
39.1
3358460

Total
Number
%
6222750 84.0
1188470 16.0
7411215

b) Owned Households
Household
Type
One-family
Multiple-family
Number
%
Number
%
5043890
86.7
138630
88.5
773335
13.3
18060
11.5
5817225
156695

Non-family
Number
%
1040225
72.4
397070
27.6
1437300

Total
Number
%
2336510 60.4
1531605 39.6
3868115

c) Rented Households
Household
Type
One-family
Multiple-family
Number
%
Number
%
1301550
68.2
30030
79.8
607775
31.8
7595
20.2
1909325
37630

Non-family
Number
%
1004925
52.3
916235
47.7
1921160
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